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In 2001, Iowa instituted a state program called Vision Iowa. This program aimed to enhance 
recreational, cultural, educational or entertainment attractions available to the general public across Iowa.  
Iowa communities could apply for state funding for a wide variety of projects.  The project was funded by 
taxes imposed on casinos.  Because the State only allowed casinos in a few locations, the Vision Iowa 
program aimed to spread the benefits of the casinos more broadly including communities that were not 
given the right to host a casino. Projects were supposed to enhance tourism.   
Between 2001 and 2008, the $228 million public investment by Vision Iowa helped spur almost 
$2 billion in new public facilities and improvements through 393 projects in 94 of Iowa’s 99 counties.  
Thirty-four percent of the projects and 33% of the allocated funds were assigned to cultural amenities.  
Investments in recreational and outdoor amenities represented 56% of all projects but just 26% of all 
funds, and so recreational amenities tended to be smaller on average.   In contrast, entertainment 
amenities accounted for 10% of the projects but 42% of all funds, so entertainment projects were much 
larger than average. 
Although the rationale for the program was to allocate some of the casino revenue to the counties 
that were not allocated a casino, counties with casinos received the majority of the funds.  Twenty-three 
percent of the projects representing 63% of the allocated funds were placed in the 13 casino counties.  
However, this reflects the fact that casinos tended to be in larger counties and larger counties had larger 
projects.  Larger counties were also better able to provide the required local match which averaged 80% 
of the project costs.  Over three-quarters of the projects were placed in towns with fewer than 10,000 
residents. 
  This study shows that tourism did respond positively to the local public amenities built as part of 
the Vision Iowa program.  County taxable retail sales rose by 0.9% for every 1% increase in expenditures 
on the projects.  Because the State of Iowa taxes sales at 5% of each additional dollar of sales induced by 
the program, the State benefited particularly from its investments in local amenities.  The State’s return 
averaged 9.2% per year in increased sales tax revenue induced by the program.  Returns to the local 
community were much smaller at 0.9% per year because the local area invested four times more than the 
state and because local sales tax was limited to no more than 2% of induced taxable sales. 
  The program would be counterproductive if it caused a shift in retail sales from surrounding 
communities to the locality building the new public amenity.  However, we find significant increases in 
taxable retail sales in the surrounding areas as well.  The finding of positive spillovers to the State and to 
the surrounding communities from newly built local public amenities suggest that without the State 
subsidy, local communities would undersupply public amenities aimed at attracting visitors. 
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  If you build it, will they come?:  Fiscal federalism, local provision of public tourist 
amenities, and the Vision Iowa Fund 
 
Daddy, we don't have to sell the farm.  People will come…from all over. 
They'll just decide to take a vacation, see?  And they'll come to lowa City. 
They'll think it's really boring.  So they'll want to pay us. 
Like buying a ticket. 
It will be just like when they were kids, a long time ago. 
Karin Kinsella to her father Ray, Field of Dreams (1989) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research documenting the importance of local amenities in fostering economic growth 
has sparked a burgeoning interest in amenity-led rural development efforts.  Amenity-led 
development efforts can have a variety of positive economic effects (Power, 2006).  Most 
directly, they may spur tourism which supports increased retail expenditures, employment and 
new firm entry.  Amenities may also draw new residents and new workers to the area (Deller et 
al., 2001; McGranahan, 1999; Nord and Cromertie 1997).  
While much of the research focus has been on natural amenities -- pleasant climates, 
oceans, lakes, and other beautiful landscapes-- more recent studies recognize the importance of 
man-made amenities as well.  Built amenities such as recreation facilities can complement 
natural ones, resulting in stronger growth impacts than would occur from the natural ones alone 
(Olfert and Partridge, 2010).  Cultural amenities such as museums or music venues contribute to 
local quality of life and encourage in-migration (Clark, 2003; Florida, 2002; Partridge, et al. 
2008; Wojan, Lambert & McGranahan 2007).   
In states lacking natural amenities such as Iowa where vistas range from corn on the right 
and soybeans on the left, amenities must be manufactured.  A long-standing issue in public 
economics is whether local communities will provide the optimal level of such public amenities.    
If benefits from the public amenities spillover to nonresidents (Gordon, 1983), or if funding for the amenity is generated by distortionary local taxes (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986), the  local 
government will under-invest in local public goods relative to the optimal level.  One solution to 
this under-provision of local public goods is the provision of matching grants from a higher level 
of government. When appropriately designed, these matching grants can induce local 
governments to incorporate the interjurisdictional spillover benefits in their decision making, 
lessening the costs arising from a lack of coordination among communities, while preserving 
local decision-making authority (Gordon, 1983; Oates, 1999; Oates, 2005). 
This study examines whether an Iowa state program that offered partial investment in 
local public cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities paid off for the state.  In 2001, 
Iowa instituted Vision Iowa, a program that provided partial funding to Iowa communities for a 
wide variety of projects ranging from relatively small aquatic centers, park improvements and 
libraries to large convention centers and performance and sports arenas. Over eight years, the 
$228 million public investment by Vision Iowa helped spur almost $2 billion in new public 
facilities and improvements in 91 of the 99 counties in Iowa.   
We find that the Vision Iowa program significantly raised taxable sales relative to past 
county-specific trend growth in sales in the counties that built new public amenities.  The State 
of Iowa made a 9.2% return per year on their investment in the form of a 5% sales tax on every 
additional dollar of sales generated.  Neighboring counties also experienced more modest but 
statistically significant growth in taxable sales relative to trend.  Therefore, we find two ways 
that benefits from the local amenities spilled over to other jurisdictions, implying that local 
governments would have undersupplied these built amenities without the state subsidy.  The 
communities that hosted the new amenities had a much more modest 0.9% per year return on their investments in the form of induced increase in local sales taxes, but they also received the 
utility from having the new amenities in town. 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Tiebout (1956) argued that variation in the provision of local public goods and tax rates 
allowed people to “vote with their feet.” Mobile residents choose to live in the community that 
best meets their willingness to pay for and utility from government services.  An implication is 
that communities can compete for residents by providing a mix of publicly funded amenities that 
is particularly attractive to populations it wishes to attract.   On the other hand, attractive public 
goods will raise the value of inelastically supplied local land as migrants attracted by the 
amenities bid up land values.  Property tax receipts rise with rising land values.  As a result, the 
property tax can be viewed as a residential user fee on local public goods (Hamilton, 1975, 
1976).  In fact, Glaeser (1996) contends it is the opportunity to raise local taxes that provides an 
incentive for local governments to provide the amenities that local residents desire.  But Bewley 
(1981) shows  that the assumptions necessary for a Tiebout equilibrium are unrealistic. 
Effectively, there have to be enough communities to allow every consumer type to move to a 
unique community type that maximizes utility for that group of homogeneous consumers.  Costs 
of public services have to be proportional to the number served, which means public amenities 
cannot be pure public goods.  Deviations from these assumptions imply that the local 
government may not optimally provide local public goods.  
Other authors argue that if capital is mobile across communities or if local governments 
cannot restrict consumption of public amenities to local residents, then the local government will 
underinvest in local public goods.  In the first case, property taxes artificially increase the cost of 
private capital.  This distortion in the cost of capital will cause investors to shift toward low tax jurisdictions.  Knowing this, local governments will hold back on the provision of public services 
relative to the level provided if they had access to a nondistortionary revenue source (Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski, 1986; Zodrow, 2006). 
The second case occurs when the benefits from the amenity spillover to other 
jurisdictions.  As originally modeled by Gordon (1983), these spillovers to other jurisdictions can 
be positive or negative.  Citizens in other jurisdictions can benefit from one community’s 
investment in a public library (as an example) in several ways. Nonresidents can use the library 
without having to pay supportive taxes; population may shift to the community with the library 
which lowers congestion costs of consuming public goods in other jurisdictions; or other 
jurisdictions might shift tax revenues toward other public goods due to a reduced need to provide 
library services.   On the other hand, the library could have negative spillover effects on other 
jurisdictions by attracting nonresident shoppers whose sales taxes help support the library or by 
inducing higher costs of public service provision elsewhere as those jurisdictions raise their own 
library expenditures as a competitive response.  In addition, if there are returns to scale in library 
provision, it may be cost effective for one jurisdiction to specialize in library provision while 
other jurisdictions specialize in other regional public goods (Zax, 1988).   
The existence of these price distortions and externalities means that reliance solely on 
local taxes to pay for local public amenities can result in an inefficient investment in local public 
goods.  Gordon (1983) and Oates (1999, 2005) argue that fiscal federalism offers a mechanism to 
induce the optimal level of public goods provision.  Because distortionary local taxes and 
positive external benefits lead local governments to underproduce local public amenities, state or 
federal matching grants can induce additional investment in local public goods.  If local public 
goods impose negative externalities on nonresidents, the local government overproduces local public goods as they do not incorporate the negative consequences of their local amenities on 
their neighbors.  Taxing local public goods would be the natural central remedy, but the 
Constitution limits the federal government’s power to tax local governments.  However, the 
federal and state governments can regulate the level of local public good provision.  For 
example, state governments place limits on local per pupil expenditures in public schools in 
order to equalize school quality across school districts.   
 The theory of fiscal federalism has been put in practice in numerous settings: Medicare, 
welfare reform, school finance, job training, public transit, disaster relief, and public housing.  
The rationale for these multilevel funding methods presumes positive spillover benefits from 
public goods, an assumption that holds broadly for public goods (Pereira and Roca-Sagalés, 
2003; Pinto, 1997).  However, negative spillovers are found for several public amenity 
investments.  For example, Boarnet’s (1998) work provides evidence of negative spillover 
effects across counties from highway infrastructure investments.  Mobile capital tends to migrate 
toward places with the best infrastructure.  His finding is corroborated by others who find that 
local projects draw economic activity away from areas that do not receive the benefit of federal 
highway spending (Holl, 2004; Shirley and Winston, 2004; Cohen and Morrison Paul, 2007).   
3. THE VISION IOWA PROGRAM 
  In 2001, the state of Iowa instituted Vision Iowa, a program aimed to enhance 
recreational, cultural, educational, or entertainment attractions available to the general public 
across the state.  Iowa communities could apply for state funding for a wide variety of projects.  
The project was funded by taxes imposed on casinos.  Because the State only allowed casinos in 
a few locations, the Vision Iowa program aimed to spread the benefits of the casinos more broadly including communities that were not given the right to host a casino. Vision Iowa only 
provided partial funding for the projects with the majority having to be raised locally. 
This study examines the benefits incidence from a state effort to induce more local 
provision of public cultural, entertainment and recreational amenities in Iowa.  The State of Iowa 
paid about 20% of the costs of these local projects and the balance was paid by local taxes and/or 
other grants or charitable donations.  Iowa is a good laboratory for evaluating such policies 
because the state is divided into 99 counties of roughly equal size, few of which have naturally 
occurring amenities that might complicate the identification of any returns to man-made 
amenities. The project fits the fiscal federalist response to a presumed underprovision of local 
public amenities caused by local reliance on distortionary property taxes and/or positive spillover 
of benefits to nonresidents.   
Funded projects were selected by a Vision Iowa Board, whose members were appointed 
by the Governor based on experience or expertise in the field of tourism development and 
promotions, public financing, architecture, engineering, major facility development or 
construction. The Vision Iowa Board was charged with ensuring that projects would improve the 
quality of life or quality of attraction in the community, create an economic impact, and use 
planning principles such as efficient land use and existing infrastructure.  
Between 2001 and 2008, the $228 million public investment by Vision Iowa helped spur 
almost $2 billion in new public facilities and improvements through 393 projects in 94 of Iowa’s 
99 counties. Over three-quarters of the projects were placed in towns with fewer than 10,000 
residents, and only 13% were located in towns with populations over 50,000. Although the 
rationale for the program may have been to allocate some of the monopoly rents earned in 
counties hosting the casinos to the counties that were not allocated a casino, there was an apparent tendency to reinvest the Vision Iowa funds in the same casino counties that generated 
the revenue.  Twenty-three percent of the projects representing 63% of the allocated funds were 
placed in the 13 casino counties.  However, this reflects the fact that casinos tended to be in 
larger counties.  Larger counties, including counties with casinos, were better able to provide the 
required local match for projects.  Holding fixed aggregate income in the county, casino counties 
were not significantly more likely to receive Vision Iowa funding.
1 
Thirty-four percent of the projects and 33% of the allocated funds were assigned to 
cultural amenities.  Investments in recreational and outdoor amenities represented 56% of all 
projects but just 26% of all funds, and so recreational amenities tended to be smaller on average.   
In contrast, entertainment amenities accounted for 10% of the projects but 42% of all funds, so 
entertainment projects were much larger than average. 
Figure 1 portrays the average dollars per capita of both Vision Iowa subsidies and 
expenditures of local and neighboring counties over time. The graph’s upward trend illustrates 
the monetary increases in funding that culminated in numerous types of amenities over the years. 
In  dollar amounts, the state’s investment in the local county averaged around $75 per capita in 
2008, which translates to over $2.3 million per county.  The local counties’ expenditures 
averaged around $9.6 million, for a total of $11.9 million expended on local projects per county, 
with the state bearing roughly one-fifth of the project cost. The average amount spent on projects 
in neighboring counties per capita is approximately 10 times the own county investment,
2 
aggregating to $116 million in amenities in the surrounding communities.(Overall, the dollar 
amounts spurred by Vision Iowa funding represent  a substantial amount of local public 
amenities investment in the state over the period.
3  Although not by deliberate design, the Vision Iowa project offers an opportunity to 
examine whether state grants designed to induce new local public amenities actually result in a 
more efficient provision of public services.  Efficiency is enhanced if we can demonstrate 
positive externalities from these local projects that go to nonresidents.  In the case of the types of 
tourism related projects funded by the Vision Iowa program, the most plausible source of a 
positive externality is an increase in revenue from taxable retail sales that go to jurisdictions 
other than the local area receiving the new amenity.  Clear evidence of a positive externality 
exists if increased tourism raises sales not just in the own community, but in neighboring 
communities as well.  In addition, the State of Iowa benefits as it gets 5 of every 7 cent tax 
imposed per dollar of induced increase in taxable retail sales.  However, if as a result of the 
program we see a decrease in taxable retail sales in neighboring communities, then there are 
negative externalities from the Vision Iowa projects.  If true, the state grants for local provision 
of public amenities will cause overproduction of public goods which will harm the state as a 
whole.   
The Vision Iowa program represents a sudden sustained surge in funding of public 
amenities in large and small towns in all parts of the state.  Projects were subject to a selection 
process, so only the most promising projects for bolstering tourism should have been funded.  As 
such, our evaluation is not a randomized social experiment, but an attempt to measure the returns 
to the types of promising local public amenity investments that might normally meet the criteria 
of a public good.  Our results should generalize to the most promising tourism projects that 
might pass a local bond issue, but will overstate returns to any randomly placed and/or designed 
public amenity that did not require local funding or pass a state review.  
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL   Let real taxable sales in county i at time t be represented by Sit.  We assume that in the 
absence of any policy shocks, real sales are defined by the trend stationary process  
(1)        ln                       . 
Note that each county real sales series has its own unique trend and constant.   
  The real sales process shifts when exposed to a local public amenity, Ait , provided of 
course that the amenity is actually valued.  In our context, these amenities are funded in part by 
the state and in part by local tax payers.  The impacts of the two funding sources on taxable sales 
would not be the same in general because the state subsidy comes without the need for local 
taxes while the local expenditures require commitment of local resources equal to the value of 
the amenity.  The local tax obligation may lower taxable purchases by local tax payers. 
  At the same time, neighboring counties may also be introducing man-made amenities, 
Nit . These amenities may increase or decrease sales in the home county.  If such amenities 
substitute for one another, local sales will decrease in the presence of competing amenities 
elsewhere.  If such amenities complement each other, the opposite will occur. The introduction 
of these policy shocks supplements the error process in Equation (1) so that  
(2)       ln                       ln           ln           . 
 The  term      is an i.i.d error process.  The sign and significance of    and    will 
reveal whether local and area amenities affect local taxable sales and whether neighboring 
amenities are substitutes or complements.   
  To operationalize (2), we need to specify the functional form for Ait and Nit .  Note that 
these amenities were introduced first in 2000, and so we set them equal to 1 before that period 
and thereafter until the first Vision Iowa dollar is spent in the county.  We specify the quantity of 
local public amenities per person as  (3A)               
     
  ,        2000               
                      = 1, t < 2000.     
where Vit  is the cumulative infusion of real Vision Iowa funds into the local county and Lit  
is the cumulative local expenditures on these projects.  These dollar amounts are in per capita 
terms to account for differences in the scale of the projects.  The rationale is that a dollar of 
public good will be less noticeable and hence have a smaller sales externality in a metropolitan 
area than in a small town.  Effectively this presumes that cultural, entertainment and recreational 
amenities face congestion costs and must be scaled up in more populated areas.  We assume that 
the production of local amenities uses resources efficiently so that     0  and     0 .   
  We model neighboring amenities similarly as  
(3B)                
      
  ,       2000     
                    = 1, t < 2000.                  
     is the cumulative Vision Iowa investment in all contiguous counties to i.  The own county 
cumulative investments in these projects is given by     .  As before, we assume these 
investments are efficient so that     0  and     0 . 
  Inserting Equations (3A) and (3B) into Equation (2), we get 
(4) ln                        ln             ln             ln             ln            ,   
which becomes the empirical specification used to test the impact of the Vision Iowa program.  
Note that the coefficients on the dollars spent on local amenities will be the product of two 
effects, the productivity of the dollars in generating a quality public amenity and the impact of 
the amenity on sales.  Under the maintained hypothesis that these dollars are used efficiently, the signs on these compound coefficients will still reveal whether the own county and neighboring 
county amenities raise or lower local sales. 
We use several alternative measures of the dependent variable.  In addition to taxable 
retail sales, we also can specify taxable sales in eating and drinking establishments.  Further, we 
have information on the total number of firms and on the number of eating and drinking 
establishments which we use as alternative outcome measures. 
5. DATA  
We assume that the local authority is the county and that the indicator of amenity success 
or failure will depend on retail sales or the number of firms servicing the retail sector.  In Iowa, 
data on retail sales,    , and number of firms by county are available from the Iowa Retail Sales 
and Use Tax Reports, published annually by the Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance 
beginning in 1976.  Sales of all taxable goods and services and number of firms are reported in 
total and by two digit merchandise categories as long as five or more businesses within the 
category report data.  Overall taxable retail sales is available for every county and year, and data 
for eating and drinking establishments is available for all but four possible county-year cells.    
This provides  us a comprehensive 32 year window for each county to evaluate whether the 
program has any impact on consumer purchases. We convert the nominal sales data reported by 
the state to real (2008) dollars using the all item urban consumer price index (CPI-U) from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Information on each Vision Iowa project including location, project 
type, date, total dollar amount, and state contribution, Vit, was compiled annually by the Iowa 
Department of Economic Development.
4 All necessary information on cumulative investments in 
Vision Iowa projects by county were culled from those on-line reports.  Our measure of 
aggregated amenity expenditures in neighboring counties incorporated all counties with a common border excluding counties that only touch at the corners.  Authors’ summaries of these 
data are presented in section II.  
6. RESULTS 
  Table 1 reports the results of our estimation of Equation (4) using the natural log of real 
taxable retail sales and of real taxable sales in eating and drinking establishments as the 
dependent variable.  The specification requires a county-specific constant     and a county-
specific trend term    .  These 198 coefficients are estimated but not reported.  The first column 
is the reduced form effect of the state Vision Iowa subsidy on the own county and any potential 
spillover effects from grants awarded to neighboring counties. The focus on only the state 
subsidy in the own and neighboring counties effectively constrains the local expenditure effects 
         0 .    Because the Vision Iowa subsidy requires local effort, the second column 
separates the Vision Iowa effect into the direct effect of the subsidy plus any indirect effect from 
induced local expenditures.   This specification includes  the full set of four parameters reflecting 
responses to cumulative per capita state and local expenditures on Vision Iowa projects in the 
own and neighboring counties.  The reduced form effects in the first column can be compared to 
the corresponding summed effects of the subsidy and the induced local expenditure in the second 
column. 
  Turning to the first column, we find that a 1% increase in per capita cumulative state 
Vision Iowa subsidy to the county results in a 0.009% increase in county taxable retail sales. The 
effect is quite large: as the implied 1% increase in per capita subsidy amounts to about $15 
thousand in aggregate, but the induced increase in taxable sales is nearly $29.5 thousand per 
year.  The literal implication of this result is that local built amenities are complements with local 
purchases in the retail and hospitality sectors.  The state’s share in the form of a 5% sales tax on induced increases in sales is $1,474 per year, implying a state return of just under 10% per year 
per $15,000 invested.   
  The state subsidy in any one county does not occur in a vacuum as the state is also 
investing in other counties at the same time.  Investments in neighboring counties may compete 
with the effectiveness of the state subsidy in the own county.  However, it appears that Vision 
Iowa investments are complementary across counties.  Local county sales increase 0.004% from 
every 1% increase in per capita subsidies in the neighboring counties.  As a result, even counties 
that did not receive a subsidy benefited from state investments in their neighbors.  These implied 
effects are also large, amounting to $1.1 million in induced sales and $57 thousand in added sales 
tax.  Clearly the state gets a large average return from its Vision Iowa investments. 
  The reason the state gets such a large return on its investment is that it is only investing a 
fraction of the cost of the local project, but with its 5% state sales tax, it gets a disproportionate 
share of the induced return.  In contrast, the local constituents provide over 80% of the cost of 
the project but can only charge a maximum sales tax of 2% on the induced increase in sales.   
  By including the local expenditure measures ln      and ln       as additional regressors, 
we can decompose the reduced form effect of the state subsidy into components attributed to the 
share of the project costs borne by the local entity and the share borne by the state.  The results 
are reported in the second column.  Turning first to the own county effects, the returns to a 1% 
increase in the per capita state subsidy (0.006%) are nearly twice the returns to the per capita 
local expenditure.  This is true despite the fact that a 1% increase in local expenditures implies a 
dollar amount more than 4 times larger than the 1% increase in Vision Iowa subsidy.  The key 
difference is that the local expenditure requires that the community raise property taxes to pay 
for the project.  Presumably, the implied decline in local after tax income would reduce sales, even as the project might induce increased sales. In contrast, the state subsidy is paid by Casino 
earnings which have no attached local tax obligation. 
  When we include both ln      and ln     , neither coefficient is statistically significant.  
Because the amount of the local match is tied to the amount of the state award, ln      and 
ln      are highly correlated, our difficulty in estimating their independent effects is not 
surprising.  Nevertheless, the summed effect of 0.009, interpretable as the elasticity from a 1% 
increase in both local expenditure and state subsidy, is highly significant and virtually identical 
to the reduced form effect of ln      in the first column.  Using the relative size of the estimated 
coefficients on ln      and ln     , we can attribute roughly two-thirds of the increase in taxable 
local sales to the state subsidy and one-third to local expenditures.
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  The summed elasticity of local taxable sales to a 1% increase in state and local Vision 
Iowa expenditures in surrounding counties is 0.003, virtually identical to the estimate in column 
one.  While the individual coefficients are not precisely estimated, their relative magnitudes are 
sensible.  For the spill-in benefits, it is presumably the size of the project that matters most and 
not the funding source as the own county would incur no tax liabilities to fund projects in 
neighboring counties.  In fact, the response from a 1% increase in neighboring county 
expenditures is 2.5 times larger than the effect of a 1% increase in state subsidy in those 
counties, reflecting the larger implied dollar expenditure from the neighboring counties relative 
to the smaller state contribution on Vision Iowa projects. 
  The last two columns replicate the exercise except that we focus exclusively on taxable 
sales from eating and drinking establishments.  Here we find that projects in surrounding 
counties compete with own county projects in attracting customers.  Apparently restaurant and 
bar sales are more closely tied to proximity of cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities than are retail sales in general.  Nevertheless, the overall effect on taxable eating and drinking 
establishment sales of a 1% increase in state and local per capita Vision Iowa expenditures in 
own and neighboring counties is 0.006, about half of the magnitude for retail sales as a whole. 
  The results in Table 1 show significant evidence of spillover benefits from a local built 
amenity to neighboring counties in the form of increased sales and to the state in the form of 
increased sales taxes.  As we only observe completed projects, we cannot test whether the state 
subsidy increases local effort to build public amenities.  However, the existence of these external 
benefits to other jurisdictions implies that the localities would have invested less than the 
optimum amount in the absence of the Vision Iowa program.   
  Table 2 shows the corresponding effects of Vision Iowa subsidies and community 
expenditures on the number of firms per capita in the county or in eating and drinking 
establishments. The specification is the same as in Table 1.  In the first column, we find a small 
positive effect of the Vision Iowa spent locally, but a larger negative effect of Vision Iowa funds 
spent in the surrounding counties.  While the estimates are statistically significant, they are not 
large.  A 1% increase in the state subsidy in the local county would result in an increase of 
0.001% in the number of firms or less than one more firm in the county.  A 1% increase in the 
subsidy in the surrounding counties lowers by 7 the number of local firms. 
  When we include both ln      and ln     , we find that all of the apparent firm growth 
attributable to local expenditures on Vision Iowa projects is due to the local match.  A 1% 
increase in the expenditure in the local county results in an increase of 0.003% in local firms, 
roughly 2 added firms.  Vision Iowa investments in the surrounding counties have mixed effects 
with the state subsidy increasing local firm numbers and the local match decreasing local firms   
The summed effect of a 1% increase in both the local expenditure and the Vision Iowa subsidy in surrounding counties is just marginally smaller than the reduced form effect in column 1, 
implying the loss of 6 firms. When we focus on eating and drinking establishments, the sector 
presumably most sensitive to Vision Iowa projects, we get very similar qualitative results.  The 
summed effect of local projects funded by local expenditure plus the Vision Iowa subsidy is 
almost 4 times larger than the summed effect in column 2.  A 1% increase in local expenditure 
from both sources increases number of firms by 0.005%. Expenditures in surrounding counties 
have a modestly larger negative effect of -.008% for every 1% increase.  
Overall, the effect of the program on firms in Table 2 is similar to the effect on sales in 
Table 1.  The direction of the summed effects of local expenditures and of expenditures on 
surrounding counties are the same on sales and firm numbers in the eating and drinking 
establishment sector.  Own county expenditures have similar effects on total sales and firm 
numbers also.  However, amenity expenditures in surrounding counties raise total sales but 
reduce total firm numbers.  While statistically significant, the actual change in firm numbers is 
numerically small. 
  To make the results more concrete, we report the implied effects of a one dollar per 
capita infusion in Vision Iowa subsidy or local expenditure match in the local county or in the 
surrounding counties.  A one dollar per capita increase corresponds to a $29,558 in aggregate 
expenditure when we apply the average county population over the sample period.  These results, 
based on simulations of the second and fourth columns of Tables 1 and 2, are reported in Table 
3. 
First, looking at the effects on total sales, we can see that a $1 per capita infusion of 
Vision Iowa grant results in an annual increase of total taxable sales of $35,757.  This is not the 
full effect as the infusion requires a local match.  The effect of $1 per capita of Vision Iowa subsidy plus $1 per capita of local match rises to $40,472 in increased sales per year.  These 
investments do not occur in a vacuum, and so similar investments are occurring in other counties 
that could complement or compete with local sales.  When we add an additional dollar per capita 
in Vision Iowa subsidy and local match in the surrounding counties, we find that local sales rise 
an additional $742 from projects in neighboring counties to a total of $41,213.   
Is this a good deal for the state?   The best measure of the state’s return is      4      
from an infusion of $1 of state Vision Iowa subsidy per capita.  The rationale is that each $1 of 
state investment generated an average of $4 of local investment.  From the state’s perspective, 
the infusion of $29,558 yields an increase in taxable sales of $35,757 + 4*$4,714 = $54,614 per 
year.
6  The state sales tax is 5% of this or $2,731 per year.  The internal rate of return for the 
state is 0.092.  The general equilibrium effects make this a lower-bound estimate of the return, as 
the Vision Iowa subsidy in one county increases sales modestly in surrounding counties as well. 
Is this a good deal for the locality?  The local cost is $118,232 to generate the increase in 
local sales of $54,614.  The local sales tax is 2%, so the induced local sales tax revenue is $1,092 
per year.  The internal rate of return is 0.009 or roughly one-tenth the return that goes to the state.  
However, the local area also gets the value of consuming the new local amenity, and so the true 
local return must be larger than 0.009. 
It is apparent that the state has a substantial interest in encouraging the development of 
these local cultural, recreational and entertainment amenities.  Just through the induced sales tax 
revenue, the state makes back a good return on its investment.  The return to the local 
community is much more modest.  Because some of the return is externalized and because the 
local government’s return is quite modest even with the subsidy, it seems apparent that the local 
communities would undersupply these amenities without the state subsidy. For completeness, we include the related impacts on total firm numbers and on the eating 
and drinking sector from dollar per capita investments by source and location.  Note that if we 
continue to apply the 4 to 1 average local match required by the program, the implied total effect 
of a dollar per capita Vision Iowa infusion on total firm numbers is -0.021 + 4*0.01 = 0.02 local 
firms added to the local market, so on net, the Vision Iowa project has a small positive effect on 
firm numbers.  The general equilibrium effects on other counties go in the opposite direction, so 
even this modest change in firm numbers is an overestimate. 
The impacts on eating and drinking establishments show that the benefits of the program 
are more broadly felt than just the food service sector.  The total sales effect is a factor of ten 
larger than that on restaurants and bars.  However, the effect on firm numbers are felt more 
intensely in the food service sector, albeit still of modest size. 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
  For eight years, the State of Iowa offered local areas the possibility of getting a subsidy 
for approved local built amenities.  The Vision Iowa program resulted in 393 new publicly 
funded local amenities aimed at attracting visitors to the locales.  Our analysis indicates that on 
average, the amenities increased county taxable retail sales relative to the county’s past trend 
sales growth by 0.9% for every 1% growth in expenditures on local amenities.  These built 
amenities also had spillover benefits to neighboring communities in the form of smaller induced 
growth in taxable sales.  In addition, because the state taxes each dollar of added sales by 5%, the 
state receives benefits from the program as well.  Viewed as an investment, the State’s 
expenditures on the Vision Iowa program generated an average return of 9.2% per year in 
increased sales tax revenues.  Returns to the locality were a bit less than 1% per year.   Our results show why left to themselves, local areas will underinvest in public amenities 
aimed at attracting tourists.  Because benefits spillover to other communities and to the state as a 
whole, the subsidy from the state is necessary to induce local communities to provide the 
efficient level of the local public good.  Hence, built local amenities aimed at attracting visitors 
are a case where fiscal federalism improves local provision of public goods. 
People will come Ray. 
They'll come to Iowa for reasons they can't even fathom. 
Terrance Mann to Ray Kinsella Field of Dreams (1989) 
  In the case of Vision Iowa projects, they did come, as Karin Kinsella and Terrance Mann 
predicted.  But they only come if built, and spillover benefits to other jurisdictions mean that 
tourist amenities may remain as dreams without the state subsidy.
                                                            
1 This does not contradict the earlier results that projects were atypically in small towns as the 
towns tended to be in wealthier counties.  
2 In figure 1, the projects in neighboring counties are scaled down by a factor of ten. 
3 The program was replaced in 2008 by two new programs that together are about half as large as 
the Vision Iowa program.  Both programs are focused on tourism, one related to enhancements 
along waterways and lakes, and the other on community attractions.   
4 Project summaries are available at 
http://www.iowalifechanging.com/documents/documents.aspx?id=27#T 
5 This is not literally decomposable as one cannot separate the state subsidy from the local 
expenditure as the two are intimately tied.  One cannot, for example, presume that spending only 
the state subsidy would induce an increase in taxable sales 2/3 as large as the total.  The more 
correct interpretation is that given the overall size of the project, the induced increase in local                                                                                                                                                                                                  
sales is larger as the share of the cost borne by the state increases and the share borne locally 
decreases.   
6 This is an underestimate because neighboring counties would have modest increases in taxable 
sales also. 
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  Table 1: Regressions of the Log of Real County Taxable Sales on Cumulative Vision 
Iowa Expenditures per Capita 
 
Total Sales 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishment Sales 
Own County        
ln       0.009*** 0.006  0.007***  0.005 
 (8.35)  (1.49)  (6.23)  (1.37) 
ln         0.003   0.002 
    (0.93)    (0.53) 
Surrounding Counties        
ln        0.004*** 0.001 -0.003***  0.019 
 (3.79)  (0.08)  (-3.13)  (1.52) 
ln         
0.002   -0.020* 
    (0.22)    (-1.78) 
N 3267  3267  3266  3266 
R
2  0.44 0.44  0.18  0.18 
Summed Effects        
        
ln       l n         0.009***    0.007*** 
   (7.78)    (6.15) 
ln       l n             0.003**   -0.001 
   (2.47)    (1.00) 
ln        ln       ln       l n           0.012***   0.006*** 
   (8.55)    (3.97) 
 
County Fixed Effects  √  √  √  √ 
County-specific trends  √  √  √  √ 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance:   significant at the 10-
percent level;    significant at the 5-percent level;     significant at the 1-percent level. 
 
  Table 2: Regressions of the Log of Firm Numbers on Cumulative Vision Iowa               
Expenditures per Capita 
 
Total Firms 
Eating and Drinking 
Establishments 
Own County        
ln       0.001*** -0.001  0.006***  -0.004 
 (2.53)  (-0.72)  (7.63)  (-1.37) 
ln        0.003*    0.009*** 
    (1.68)    (3.75) 
Surrounding Counties        
ln        -0.008*** 0.011** -0.008***  -0.007 
 (-18.42)  (1.96)  (-12.17)  (-0.77) 
ln         
-0.017***   -0.002 
    (-3.44)    (-0.21) 
        
N   3267  3267  3263  3263 
R
2  0.393 0.396  0.182  0.186 
Summed Effects   
ln       l n        0.001***   0.005*** 
  (2.59)   (6.53) 
ln       l n           -0.007***   -0.008*** 
  (10.65)   (8.61) 
ln        ln       ln       l n           -0.005*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 (8.07)    (2.97) 
  
County Fixed Effects  √  √  √  √ 
County-specific trends  √  √  √  √ 
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Asterisks denote significance:   significant at the 10-
percent level;    significant at the 5-percent level;     significant at the 1-percent 
level. Table 3: Implied Real Returns from a One Dollar per Capita Vision Iowa Subsidy or Expenditure
a
 
  Change in ….       Change in …. 
Dollar Change per Capita  Total Sales  Dollar Change per Capita  Eating and Drinking Sales
Vit  $35,757.37  Vit  $2,983.56 
Lit     4,714.35  Lit      241.89 
            437.62             757.85 
            303.97            -228.24 
Vit + Lit   40,471.72  Vit + Lit     3,225.45 
                   741.59                      529.61 
Vit + Lit +              41,213.31  Vit + Lit +                3,755.06 
  
Dollar Change per Capita  Total Firms  Dollar Change per Capita  Eating and Drinking Firms 
Vit  -0.021  Vit    -0.005 
Lit  0.010  Lit      0.003 
      0.013           -0.001 
      -0.006                      <  -0.0001 
Vit + Lit  -0.011  Vit + Lit         0.0021 
              0.007                  -0.001 
Vit + Lit +             -0.003  Vit + Lit +               -0.003 
       
aA one dollar increase per capita corresponds to a $29,558 expenditure on average. 
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Figure 1:  Average Cumulative Vision Iowa Subsidy and County 
Expenditure per Capita, Own and Neighboring Counties, 1976‐2008
Subsidy/10 in  
Neighboring Counties
Subsidy in  Own  
County
Local Expenditure/10 in  
Neighboring Counties
Local Expenditure 
in  Own County